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I n a case of first impression, the Court of Appeals of 
Maryland held that the state 
medical examiner may testify as to 
a murder victim's manner of death 
when the medical examiner's 
autopsy report, which notes 
manner of death, has been 
admitted into evidence. Sippio v. 
State, 350 Md. 633, 714 A.2d 864 
(1998). The court also held that a 
criminal defendant may not 
present character evidence of his 
truthfulness without first 
testifying, or, in the alternative, 
without requesting to vary the 
order of proof, and making a 
binding proffer of his intention to 
testify. The ruling sets forth a new 
trend because the court had never 
considered the admissibility of a 
medical examiner's opmIOn 
testimony as to manner of death. 
On December 30, 1995, 
Dwayne Sippio ("Sippio") fired a 
shot that killed Brenda Branch 
("Branch"). Although Sippio 
confessed to the shooting, he 
maintained that it was an accident. 
At trial, the court admitted into 
evidence the victim's autopsy 
report prepared by Dr. John 
Smialek, Chief Medical Examiner 
for the State of Maryland which 
stated the victim's manner of 
death. In its case-in-chief, the 
prosecution offered Dr. Smialek's 
testimony that Branch's manner of 
death was homicide. Sippio 
objected, contending that Dr. 
Smialek's testimony was improper 
as it resolved an ultimate legal 
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issue reserved for the jury. The 
trial court overruled the objection 
and allowed the testimony. Sippio 
additionally sought to introduce 
testimony as to his character for 
truthfulness without first 
testifying. The court sustained the 
state's objection to the testimony 
and excluded the evidence. 
Sippio was convicted in the 
Circuit Court for Baltimore City of 
second degree murder, felonious 
use of a handgun, and unlawfully 
wearing, carrying, and transporting 
a handgun. The Court of Special 
Appeals of Maryland, in a per 
curium opinion, affirmed the 
conviction. The Court of Appeals 
of Maryland affirmed that ruling 
after carefully considering the role 
of expert testimony, the procedure 
for offering character evidence 
under the common law, and the 
Maryland Rules of Evidence. 
Recent Developments 
The court of appeals addressed 
the admissibility of a medical 
examiner's testimony as to a 
murder victim's manner of death 
by reviewing an earlier decision 
where the court considered the 
admissibility of a death certificate 
that contained a medical 
examiner's written opinion as to 
manner of death. Sippio, 350 Md. 
at 645, 714 A.2d at 870. In 
Benjamin v. Woodring, 268 Md. 
593, 303 A.2d 779 (1973), the 
court held that the manner of death 
portion of the death certificate was 
inadmissible because it contained 
"such non-factual information as 
'indications, inferences, or 
conclusions drawn by the 
certificate maker that did not 
qualify as 'essential facts 
concerning the medical causes of 
death.'" Sippio, 350 Md. at 644-
45, 714 A.2d at 870 (quoting 
Benjamin, 268 Md. at 606, 608, 
303 A.2d at 787, 788). Sippio 
argued that the Benjamin court's 
holding should be extended to 
preclude a medical examiner from 
testifying concerning manner of 
death. Id. at 645, 714 A.2d at 870. 
Before distinguishing 
Benjamin from the instant case, 
however, the court of appeals first 
examined Health General Article 
of the Annotated Code of 
Maryland, section 5-301 et seq., 
which establishes the procedures a 
medical examiner must follow 
when a death results from suicide, 
homicide, or accident. !d. The 
court noted that the 1990 
29.1 U. Balt. L.F. 75 
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amendment to section 5-311 added 
the words "manner of death" to the 
list of items the medical examiner 
must include in an autopsy report. 
Id at 646, 714 A.2d at 871. The 
court reasoned, therefore, that "[t]o 
create a per se rule prohibiting 
such testimony would be akin to 
holding that medical examiners are 
not qualified to determine manner 
of death, or that medical 
examiners' findings are generally 
unreliable evidence in a court of 
law." Id. at 647, 714 A.2d at 871. 
In differentiating Benjamin 
from the instant case, the court 
reviewed Terry v. State, 34 Md. 
App. 99, 366 A.2d 65 (1976), 
where the Court of Special 
Appeals of Maryland upheld the 
admissibility of a medical 
examiner's opinion testimony as to 
manner of death. Sippio, 350 Md. 
at 647, 714 A.2d at 871. In Terry, 
which was decided prior to the 
1990 amendment to section 5-311, 
the court held that despite the 
Benjamin court's suggestion that a 
medical examiner's investigative 
duties were limited by law to 
essential facts concerning the 
medical causes of death, "'we 
cannot conceive that this precludes 
calling the medical examiner as an 
expert witness to express his 
opinion in a case.'" Id. at 647-48, 
714 A.2d at 871 (quoting Terry, 34 
Md. App. at 107-08, 366 A.2d at 
70). Adopting the court's rational 
in Terry, the court held that 
Benjamin was inapposite to the 
instant case and that testimony 
concerning manner of death was 
appropriate. !d. at 648, 714 A.2d 
at 872. Additionally, the court 
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noted that when Benjamin was 
decided, "determining manner of 
death was merely 'incumbent upon 
[medical examiners] in completing 
the [death certificate] form.''' Id 
at 647, 714 A.2d at 871 (quoting 
Benjamin, 268 Md. at 609, 303 
A.2d at 788). Accordingly, the 
court declined Sippio's request to 
prohibit the medical examiner's 
testimony regarding manner of 
death. Id. at 648, 714 A.2d at 872. 
After determining that the 
subject of the testimony was 
appropriate, the court looked to 
Maryland Rule of Evidence 5-702 
and found that the admissibility of 
expert testimony depends on 
whether it would aid the trier of 
fact in understanding the evidence 
or in determining a fact in issue. 
Id at 649, 714 A.2d at 872. The 
court found that Dr. Smialek's 
testimony aided the jury's 
understanding when he explained 
that homicide was the killing of 
one human being by another, 
regardless of intent, and that a 
medical exammer does not 
consider the intent of the suspect 
when investigating the manner of 
death. Id at 652, 656, 714 A.2d at . 
874, 875. The court noted that 
without Dr. Smialek's testimony, 
the jurors might have given the 
word "homicide" a "degree of 
culpability greater than its 
definition allows." Id. 
The court analyzed Dr. 
Smialek's testimony and 
determined that it met the three 
requirements outlined in Maryland 
Rule 5-702. Id. at 649, 714 A.2d 
at 872. In so doing, the court 
found that: (1) Dr. Smialek's 
training and professional 
experience qualified him to testify 
as an expert; (2) the subject matter 
was appropriate for expert 
testimony because Dr. Smialek 
clearly described the fatal gunshot 
wound in terms understandable to 
the jury; and (3) a legally 
sufficient factual basis existed to 
support the testimony because Dr. 
Smialek performed the autopsy 
and reviewed the facts surrounding 
the shooting. Id. at 649-53, 714 
A.2d at 872-74. The court 
concluded, therefore, that Dr. 
Smialek's testimony as to manner 
of death was a proper subject for 
expert testimony. Id. at 652, 714 
A.2d at 874. 
The court also rejected 
Sippio's assertion that Dr. 
Smialek's testimony concerning 
the victim's manner of death was a 
legal conclusion reserved for the 
jury. Id at 653, 714 A.2d at 874. 
The court determined that the 
ultimate issue was not whether 
Branch's death was a homicide, 
but whether the shooting was 
accidental or deliberate. Id. at 655, 
714 A.2d at 875. The court found 
that Dr. Smialek's testimony as to 
manner of death did not address 
Sippio's intent and was, therefore, 
appropriate. Id. at 654, 714 A.2d 
at 875. The court cautioned, 
however, that its holding was 
limited to the situation where a 
medical examiner's report was 
properly admitted into evidence, 
and not where a report's 
admissibility was contested. !d. at 
656, 714 A.2d at 875. Sippio 
waived the latter issue, according 
to the court, when he did not 
object to the introduction of the 
medical examiner's report into 
evidence. Id. 
In addressing the second issue 
concerning character evidence, the 
court examined specific 
circumstances under which 
character evidence is permissible. 
Id. at 663, 714 A.2d at 879. The 
court first affirmed the 
requirement that a criminal 
defendant must testify before 
presenting character evidence for 
truthfulness. Id. at 664, 714 A.2d 
at 879. In so doing, the court 
found that a defendant's promise 
to testify during opening argument 
was not binding, and therefore, 
failed to meet the requirement. Id. 
at 665, 714 A.2d at 880. The court 
next looked to Maryland Rule of 
Evidence 5-608, and agreed that a 
defendant's character for 
truthfulness first must be attacked 
before a witness may offer 
testimony supporting the 
defendant's character for 
truthfulness. Id. at 663, 714 A.2d 
at 879. The court then reviewed 
Sahin v. State, 337 Md. 304, 653 
A.2d 452 (1995), which held that a 
criminal defendant may offer 
character evidence for truthfulness 
without the prosecution first 
attacking the defendant's 
character. Sippio, 350 Md. at 662, 
714 A.2d at 879. The court in 
Sahin reasoned that because the 
defendant was charged with a 
character impeaching offense, the 
charge alone represented a 
sufficient attack on the defendant's 
character. Id. at 663, 714 A.2d at 
879. However, the court in Sippio 
noted that the key to Sahin was 
that a defendant must still testify in 
order to present the character 
evidence. Id. at 664, 714 A.2d at 
879. To permit a criminal 
defendant to present character 
evidence without first testifying, 
the court reasoned, allows the 
defendant to support his or her 
good character for truthfulness 
without first placing that character 
trait at issue. Id. The court, 
however, noted that Maryland 
Rules 5-104(b) and 5-611(a) 
permit a judge to vary the order in 
which a defendant presents 
evidence, thereby allowing a 
defendant to present character 
evidence before testifying. Id. at 
665, 714 A.2d at 880. However, a 
defendant must make a binding 
announcement that he will testify. 
Id. 
In Sippio v. State, the court held 
that opinion testimony by a 
medical examiner as to manner of 
death is appropriate to supplement 
a properly admitted medical 
examiner's report. This places an 
undue burden on a defendant who 
must overcome a seemingly 
irrebuttable presumption when 
testimony is admitted that the 
victim's manner of death was 
homicide. A special instruction to 
the jury to consider the testimony 
only for its medical relevance, and 
not as conclusive evidence of the 
defendant's intent, may provide 
the defendant with some leverage 
against the testimony. Another 
option is to object to the 
introduction of the medical 
examiner's report and seek to have 
the testimony similarly excluded. 
As the court here seems to have 
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limited the introduction of a 
medical examiner's testimony to 
instances where the medical 
examiner's report is admitted into 
evidence, such an objection may 
prevent the opinion testimony 
from being introduced into 
evidence. 
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